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What is the Right
Energy Policy for America?
by Murray Weidenbaum
The rapid rise in gasoline prices following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has stirred renewed
interest in the idea that the United States should
adopt an energy policy. That notion is reenforced by the fact that we now import one-half
of the oil we use, which makes us very vulnerable to all sorts of overseas disruptions (see
Figure 1).
The sad fact, which few Americans seem to
remember, is that the United States did have an
active energy policy in the 1970s. The Department of Energy controlled the price of
gasoline (and of other fuels) and also allocated
the supply of gasoline by state and type of user.
Under the circumstances, there were no shortages of governmental rules, directives and
prohibitions governing the production and use
of energy.
The results, to put it kindly, were counterproductive - widespread fuel shortages and
long lines at service stations. The contrast with
Western Europe and Japan was striking. Although both of those regions were far more dependent on imported oil than the United States
(Japan imports close to 100 percent of its oil
supply), neither of them experienced the
inconveniences and problems that American
motorists suffered during the 1970s.
The reason was clear. Unlike the United
States, these other nations did not try to keep
the domestic price of gasoline below the worldmarket level.

Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished
University Professor and Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a member of the Energy
Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the
United States.

cheaper, and less when it becomes more expensive. Second, those who supply energy will
produce more at higher prices than at lower
prices.

Figure 1

U.S. Dependence on Oil Imports
(Imports as Percentage of Domestic Demand)
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Source: American Petroleum Institute.

Unfortunately, consumers in this country
never made the obvious connection between
price controls and shortages . Hence, pleas for
Congress to do something about "price
gouging" are becoming louder and shriller.
But, as the Washington Post noted in a recent
editorial, "The oil shortages of the 1970s and
the gasoline lines were the result, not of OPEC
price increases, but of American price controls."!
Under the circumstances, a brief refresher
on the fundamental economics of energy would
seem helpful. The basic concepts are straightforward and should be quickly recalled by anyone who has had a freshman course in economics.

Economics of Energy2
Two economic relationships are basic to energy economics. First, people will use more
gasoline (and other forms of energy) when it is
2

Higher energy prices account
for about 80 percent of the total
energy efficiency improvements
in the United States since 1973.
The implications of these two statements,
when we think them through, are compelling.
Changes in energy prices are an important form
of information: they provide signals to both
producers and consumers. After correcting for
the effects of shifts in the industrial sector, one
study found that higher energy prices account
for about 80 percent of the total energy efficiency improvements in the United States since
1973.3
The difficulty is, however, that the process
of adjusting to price changes may not always be
as rapid as we would like. On the demand side,
many consumers own heavy "gas guzzling"
automobiles, and live in houses with little insulation and large glass windows. Even if the
price of gasoline and fuel oil rises substantially,
they will still buy about as much as before.
Thus, in the language of economists, the demand for energy is relatively "inelastic" in the
short run.
Energy conservation originally was viewed
simply as "doing without." Increasingly, however, it is becoming apparent that, by increasing the efficiency with which we use energy,
we can produce the same or higher levels of
goods and services with less energy. Buildingrelated research, for example, has produced
more efficient equipment such as the heat-pump
water heater and the so:id-state ballast for fluorescent lighting.
Over the longer run, demand for energy is
more responsive to changes in p::ice. Older and
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Figure 2

less fuel-efficient cars are traded in for newer
models that achieve more miles per gallon of
gas. Homes are better insulated, and builders
construct houses with fewer expansive "singlepane" windows. The result is a significant reduction in the demand for neating oil and other
petroleum products.
On the supply side, the response to price
movements may also be slow at first. Long
lead times are required to develop new sources
of energy. But higher-cost supplies - which
were ignored at lower prices - become commercially attractive when prices rise high
enough. The oil price increases of the 1970s
also helped develop new oil sources outside of
the United States, especially from Mexico and
British and Norwegian North Sea fields. Overall, non-OPEC production in the non-communist world surged from 14 million barrels a day
in 1976 to 23 million in 1985.
Certainly, historical evidence shows that
price increases do provide incentives for
the development of new domestic energy
supplies. In Sutton and Edwards counties,
Texas, total gas completions (a measure of
wells being dug) were raised from less than 10
to 240 in the period 1968 to 1974 while the
price of natural gas rose from 14.0 cents per
million cubic feet to $1.40 per million cubic
feet. In eastern Ohio, total gas completions
rose from 200 to 1,400 during the same
period.4
The aggregate pattern of supply response in
terms of oil wells drilled is shown in Figure 2.
The relationship between prices and supply is
clear. The number of wells drilled in the
United States declined while the price of crude
oil was static (in real terms); drilling expanded
sharply when the real price level rose. The key
point is that price changes are the basic mechanism for equilibrating demand and supply.
Since the price increases that began with the
OPEC embargo in 1973, the United States as a
whole has become a muCh less energy-intensive
society.
One measure of energy efficiency is the ratio

of energy use per unit of gross national product. This energy/GNP ratio was 27 thousand
BTUs per GNP dollar (in constant 1982 dollars) in 1949 and virtually the same in 1970
(Figure 3). Since then, steady improvement in
energy efficiency produced a nearly continuous
downward trend to 20 thousand BTUs per dollar in the late 1980s. The rate of improvement
has fluctuated: there was moderate improvement in the early 1970s, greater improvement
in the next decade or so as energy prices rose
sharply, and then a slowing in the rate of improvement in the mid-1980s as energy prices
declined.
Energy conservation can result from a variety of behavioral changes. Approximately onethird of the energy savings during the past 15
years, according to the Department of Energy,
stemmed from individuals and businesses using

4
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Figure 3

The Declining Energy/GNP Ratio
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of economic activity in the United States than it
did at the time of the first oil shock. In 1973,
27,100 BTUs of energy were required, on average, to produce $1 of GNP . By 1989, the
BTU requirement per unit of output had declined to 19,600.7
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ex1stmg energy-consuming equipment less intensively (for example, changing normal thermostat settings or reducing automobile trips).s
The other two-thirds of the savings resulted
from improvements in energy efficiency, such
as adding insulation, buying more fuel-efficient
vehicles, and building more efficient furnaces,
power generators and other equipment. For
example, in 1974, the average new car got 14
miles per gallon (mpg) and trucks 4 mpg. Currently, auto efficiency is double at 28 mpg,
while truck efficiency is up 50 percent at
6 mpg. The newer 757 jet airliner burns 40
percent less fuel per seat than the plane it replaced, the 727.6
Other efficiency improvements included developing products and processes thac are less
energy intensive. For example, structural plastics replaced steel in many uses, glass fibers
were used instead of copper wire and industrial
processes were made more energy efficient.
Changes in the energy/GNP ratio can, over
time, make significant differences in a country's energy situation. Consider the consequences if the United States had not improved
its energy efficiency since 1973, and the energy/GNP r&tio had remained constant, rather
than declining substantially. By 1989, it took
28 percent less energy to produce a given unit

6

However, energy efficiency cannot be regulated into existence. Past government attempts
to force energy efficiency beyond economic
feasibility proved ineffective. One example
was the Residential Conservation Service,
which required utilities to conduct home energy
audits for customers wanting to improve energy
efficiency. Only 6 percent of customers requested the appraisals, and even fewer followed
up. Yet program costs of more than $500 million were passed on to ratepayers before
Congress eliminated the program.

Historical Experience
It is useful to draw upon earlier experiences
in order to provide some historical context.
Over the course of our nation's history,
the American people have successively shifted
from relying primarily on one energy source to
The development of new energy
another.
sources took place with little if any
governmental intervention . For example, in
1800, illumination in the United States was
provided by candles and oil lamps, with fuel for
the lamps coming from whale oil. Yet whales
did not become extinct as the demand for
lighting expanded with a rapidly growing
population. A very substantial increase did
occur in the price of whale oil, however, from

7

Figure 4

23 cents a gallon in 1832 to $1.45 in 1865.
Price rises are always painful and unpopular. But citizens back then did not write to
their legislators, nor did newspapers castigate
the "price gougers" of the day. Consumers
simply switched to cheaper substitutes such as
coal gas, camphene distilled from vegetable
oils, and lard oil.

Energy Sources in the United States
100-.---------------,
90

Q
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Changes in consumer
demand from whale oil to
kerosene to gasoline did not
result from an act of Congress
or a subsidy from the Treasury.
The major force for change was
successive movements in the price
of the different forms of energy.
In the 1850s, coal oil or kerosene derived
from coal distillation dominated the market for
residential lighting. Its success was followed
by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a
new fuel that had appeared in the market.
Petroleum was discovered in 1859 and quickly
became the favored source for kerosene. As
crude oil production swelled, its price fell from $18 a barrel in early 1860 to 10 cents a
barrel in late 1861. By 1863, virtually all coal
refiners had shifted to refining crude oil. Many
new refineries appeared on the scene although
gasoline was considered at the time to be
a waste byproduct. 8
The changes in consumer demand from
whale oil to kerosene to gasoline did not result
from an act of Congress or a subsidy from the
Treasury. The major force for change was
successive movements in the price of the
different forms of energy. As shown in Figure
4 there have been frequent shifts in the course
of American history in the relative importance
of different fuels. In the middle of the nineteenth century, wood was the major fuel and
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cries of alarm were sounded from time to time
about the depletion of our forests. By late in
the nineteenth century, however, people shifted
to coal as relative prices changed. The implications for current policy would seem to
be clear: The sooner government frees e'lergy
sources from artificial restraints, the sooner
new energy sources will become commercially
competitive.
In contrast, just consider what might have
happened if the federal government had adopted
a formal energy policy in the nineteenth century. Some government agency surely would
have given a grant to a candlemaker to develop
an improved wick.
Another part of the
bureaucracy would have subsidized carriage
companies to test high-mileage hay for horses.
It is unlikely that any stodgy government o~
cial would have given a grant to a mavenck
such as Thomas Edison.
In a very real sense, the United Stat~s d?es
have an energy policy for the 1990s. It IS similar to the clothing policy, the refrigerator pol9

icy, and soda pop policy! It's called reliance
on the marketplace and it works better than any
alternative, hands-on policy. Surely, the failure
of the multibillion dollar synthetic fuels
program initiated in the late 1970s reminds us
of the dangers that arise when the federal government takes too active a role in attempting to
forcefeed the pace of market adjustments.9

mestic synthetic fuel industry. They specifically evaluated the effects of the environmental
impact statements (EIS) required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA). The conclusions of the task force are
worrisome for the development of any new energy source, especially when we consider that
environmental restrictions have increased in the
years since the report was written:

Interaction with
Environmental Regulations

Despite the absence of any formal energy
policy, many government actions affect the
availability of energy in powerful ways. Today, the United States has by far the most
comprehensive body of legislation to protect the
environment of any nation. The interrelationships between energy and environmental policies are numerous and significant. Often they
work at unintended cross-purposes.
For example, virtually every new energy
project has been delayed via such actions as
challenges to an environmental impact statement (EIS) or legal disputes over the process
through which the cognizant federal agency has
considered the environmental aspects or
whether it has considered all of the aspects
properly. In several instances - such as the
Shoreham nuclear power plant in Long Island
- energy projects have been abandoned even
after construction has been completed and approved.
One major study of the effects of the EIS described it as an instrument of "legal and political warfare."
The authors concluded,
"There can be no doubt that a major effect of
the EIS requirement has been to give environmental groups a legal and political instrument
to cancel, delay, or modify development projects that they oppose. "10
During the energy "shortages" of the 1970s,
a task force of the President's Energy Resources Council analyzed the regulatory problems that would be faced in developing a do10

. . . the major uncertainty under NEPA is not
whether or not the project will be allowed to
proceed, but rather the length of time it will ?e
delayed pending the issuance of an EIS that Will
stand up in court. The cost of such delays
(construction financing and inflated raw
materials and labor costs) is an obvious potential
hazard to any synfuels project. ...
In summary, the cost and delay occasioned by
NEPA constitute a substantial disincentive,
aggravated by the fact that in dealing with new
processes it is very hard to anticipate what the
EIS requirements will be and on what grounds
the EIS may be attacked. The general guidelines
offered by the Council on Environmental Quality
(40 CFR Part 1500) provide a drafting
framework but no assurance of compliance.

The Presidential Task Force also identified
14 different and often onerous regulatory constraints which would be faced in developing a
new energy project such as a synthetic fuel facility:
• Preparing an environmental impact statement, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

i

• Meeting new source performance standards
for air quality, under the Clean Air Act.
• Meeting the hazardous pollutant emission
standards, under the Clean Air Act.
• Meeting the state air-quality implementation
plans required by the Clean Air Act.
• Obtaining necessary point source discharge
permits, under the Clean Water Act.
• Meeting state water quality standards and
water quality management plans, as pro-

11

mulgated under the Clean Water Act.

Some Final Thoughts
on Energy Policy

• Complying with limitations applicable to
"underground injections," under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.

The development of government policy toward energy has been a perennial matter
of controversy in the United States. Issues of
regulation, taxation, budgeting, and national
security are, at different times, very much
involved.
An effort needs to be made to
reconcile the important but conflicting concerns
for energy, the environment, and the economy.

• Complying with the regulation of interstate
pipeline transmissions, under the Interstate
Commerce Act.
• Complying with the prohibition against a
carrier transporting its own products, under
the Interstate Commerce Act.
• Complying with the allocation of railroad
cars transporting coal, under the Interstate
Commerce Act.

If the price of gasoline had
kept up with inflation in the
1980s, consumption in the
United States today would be
nearly 20 percent lower than it is.

• Complying with the regulation of interstate
transmission of synthetic gas once it is mixed
with natural gas, under the Natural Gas Act.
• Obtaining necessary plant and mine leases,
from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management.
• Obtaining necessary water allocations, from
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
• Complying with the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act.

The task force's conclusion is noteworthy:
"In summary, some of these requirements could
easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels
plant." 11 The more recent difficulties experienced by companies attempting to build and
operate nuclear as well as conventional power
plants tend to bear out the task force's concern.
Surely, a sensible program of regulatory reform
has an ~mportant role to play in enhancing the
economtc strength of the United States be it in
regard to energy, the environment or other areas of public interest.
For instance, if Congress votes to allow exploration and development of the Coastal Plain
of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
the result might be an increase of one-third in
current U.S. oil reserves. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the area contains
as much as 9.2 billion barrels of economically
recoverable oii.12
12
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The status quo in public policy affecting energy is not adequate for the 1990s. The current
result is that gasoline prices in the United
States, despite the run-up following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, are still, in real terms
(corrected for inflation), about the same as in
1973, prior to the huge increases in oil prices
brought on by OPEC. U.S. gasoline prices are
the lowest in the industrialized world. The current level of approximately $1.35 compares to
$3.00 in West Germany, $3.50 in the United
Kingdom, and $4.30 in France. Energy expert
Philip Verleger, Jr., estimates that if the price
of gasoline had kept up with inflation in the
1980s, consumption in the United States today
would be nearly 20 percent lower than it is.B
Even more dramatic is the fact that, on average, each American uses twice as much energy
as each resident of Japan and West Germany.
If, by some stretch of the imagination, we could
bring our energy use down to that of those two
economic competitors, the United States might
be able to eliminate its need for imported oil,
and thus end its reliance on the unstable Middle
East for a key part of its energy sJpply _14
13

Notes

The principles listed below are an effort to
provide useful guidance in the emerging debate
on energy policy in the 1990s.I5
• Market forces should be depended upon to
balance energy demand and energy supply.
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